No timestamps because there’s only one question this time, so the video requires a full-watch to understand. Please consider supporting me on Patreon and help make more videos like this possible! All questions are from Patreons donating $5 or more on my Patreon - https://www.patreon.com/TIKhistory Also, thank you again to my Patreons - you’re making these videos (and the upcoming Battlestorm ones) happen!

An interesting quote to spark debate -

“Clark and Lucas therefore were clearly concerned first to establish and consolidate a beachhead, and then to leave offensive operations from it to an undefined second phase.” -  Molony, British Official History, P646

Was that really what they were doing? Is the British official history right?? Let me know your opinions.

Bit of an update regarding Battlestorm Courland 1944 - still not going to put a hard date on it, but it will be coming in February (2019) regardless. All that’s left to do is the script and the map. So, if push comes to shove, I’ll get the map done first, then release it bi-weekly so that I can finish the script in the in-between weeks. But we’ll see.

Selected Bibliography / Sources

Blackwell, I. "Anzio: Italy 1944 (Battleground Europe)." Pen & Sword Books, Kindle 2006.
Churchill, W. "Memoirs of the Second World War." Mariner Books, 1987.
Citino, R. “The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-1945.” University of Kansas, 2017.
Clark, L. “Anzio: The Friction of War.” Headline Publishing, Kindle 2013.
Molony, C. "The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V, The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944." The Naval & Military Press LTD 2004, first published in 1973.

Full list of all my WW2 and related books can be found here https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/114GiK85MPs0v4GKm0izPj3DL2CrlJUdAantx5GQUKn8/edit?usp=sharing

Thanks for watching! Bye for now!

My grandfather "fought" at Anzio.  He walked off the boat, was almost immediately shot, spent a few weeks in a field hospital, and went home with a Purple Heart.

My uncle was an artillery forward observer at Anzio.  He found some high ground because that's what observers do but the infantry didn't follow.  He was quickly overrun and spent some time hidden in a root cellar until the Americans finally took the hills.  He was always very critical of the generals and your explanation begins to explain why.  Very interesting.  By the way, my grandmother got a missing-in-action letter, the first of three, one for each of my mom's three brothers.  All were later rescinded and all three made it home in 1945.

Obviously it was Kesselrings fault for not doing exactly what Mark Clark wanted him to!!!

My uncle, Private Alex Dudchock of the 34th Infantry Regiment 168th Infantry Division Red Bulls, died at Anzio on March 25, 1944.  That was the date of the 34th's beach landing.  We only know that he died that day.  I can only imagine him approaching the beach in the landing craft, contemplating likely death, and it becoming his reality that day.  War is hell.  RIP Uncle Alex.

After breaking out of Anzio, Alexander's plan was for the Fifth Army to drive east to cut Kesselring's escape route to the north and trap much of his Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. The operation started well, but then suddenly, when leading troops were only six kilometers from closing their trap at Frosinone, the Fifth Army was re-directed and sent north towards Rome. The trap was left open. General Mark Clark was so eager that the world should see pictures showing him as the liberator of Rome, that he allowed the armies of a delighted Kesselring to escape.

He had ignored the orders of Field Marshall Alexander in a decision as militarily stupid, as it was insubordinate.

This, vain-glorious blunder, the worst of the entire war, lost us a stunning victory, lengthened the war by many months and earned Mark Clark the contempt of other American and British generals. They saw an operation that could have won the war in Italy, thrown away at the cost of many Allied lives, because of the obsession and vanity of one man.

If General Mark Clark had been in the German Army, Hitler would have had him shot.

— Alan Whicker [72]

Crosses grow on anzio where no soldier sleeps and where hells six feet deep.

Churchill was despondent.  “I had hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore,” he said, “but all we got was a stranded whale.”

You said it yourself. Rather quickly Kesselring has two corps worth of divisions available for defense and the counter attack. Whichever corps commander lands, even if it wasn't the tumid Lucas, has to 1. Land successfully (not easy) 2. Secure the beach and begin offloading essential manpower and equipment 3. Build foothold capable of holding against counterattack. 4. Establishment a logistical supply point to support further ground operations. 5. "Punch out" to the hills eastward to take off pressure from Cassino and to impede the lines of communication from Rome.

How is that possible with a single corp? That corps shortly after landing, based on Sicily and Salerno, is going to get hit by a large force of panzer and panzer grenadier combined arms attacks, as well as other infantry and Luftwaffe divisions, plus under air attack (the Allies did not have air dominance yet). Would it better to have the corps strung out a dozen miles or so from the beachhead? Remember that for any advance, units must be positioned on the flanks of the lines of communication to protect it (further bleeding off manpower)? Or to be in a consolidated position closer to naval guns that can support (as proven in Sicily and Salerno)? If you go in absolutely knowing you don't have the proper strength, that you're conducting an amphibious attack against an enemy that outnumbers you, you'd be a damned fool to send your most capable and mobile forces outside of the range of the beach before further forces could be landed.

Both Clark and Lucas both stated emphatically beforehand that there were not enough forces available to be allocated for the landing and side operation. Basic military training says you don't conduct an amphibious landing in a completely separate operational area against numerous corps defending using a single corps. Its not going to work unless the enemy are demoralized or led by fools or cowards, neither of which apply to the Germans.

The Anzio landing and flanking operation, as pushed by Churchill, Alexander, and others, was just a stupid idea, they didn't have the forces for it, being that Italy had turned into a side show for the expected invasion of France. In fairness, it wasn't executed well either, both Clark and Lucas screwed up very badly in their own ways. But they were handed essentially an impossible objective to start.

My grandfather fought with the U.S. 3rd Infantry at Anzio -- this battle has always held a place in my heart. Thank you for discussing the battle, I look forward to your more detailed analysis in the future.

I grew up in an area where most of the army veterans served in the National Guard 45th and 36th divisions while fighting in Italy, France and Germany.   I remember a few of the things that were discussed and argued about while I was hiding & listening in a nearby room.  One thing I do remember is that nobody had anything good to say about Mark Clark.  The Battle of Rapido River (though actually on the Gari River)  seems to have really been a source of bitter resentment by a number of the men.

TIK love your channel. My father was a ball turret gunner on B 17g. Never really talked about it. Ive studied ww2 for many years. Thank you!

My Dad, Sgt.Anson Knoderer; Co.F, 351st. Reg., 2nd Bat.,88th Inf. fought from Anzio through Rome to Mt. Capello sustaining two combat wounds from Feb./Sept. 1944.

I love your background and effects of Market Garden. Gives people more of a visual of what happen and battles I did not know happen.  Please do more

Clark heard Churchill’s use of “soft underbelly” shortly after the Moscow meeting, when he and Eisenhower took up the question of where the Anglo-Americans should strike first. In autumn 1942, he and Eisenhower explained to General Marshall, U.S. Army chief of staff:
A cross-channel operation was [then] utterly impossible. We could not even get across without the British showing us the way and taking us by the hand. We did not have the means. And so it was decided that we would take this matter up with Mr. Churchill, which we did. And that is where his persuasive eloquence first impressed me. He got up before a map with his pointer and he kept pointing to Gibraltar, North Africa, the Mediterranean, Sicily and Italy. Finally he said, “We should slit the soft belly of the Mediterranean.” Well, my friends, I assure you, when I landed at Salerno, I found it was a tough old gut!3

https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/soft-underbelly-fortress-europe/

My Grandfather was a Canadian member of The U.S/Canada First Special Service Force (The Black Devil's). He landed on the Anzio beach head and saw action on the Mussolini Canal, Monte La Difensa, Monte Summucro, The Breakout from Anzio and The Advance to the Tyber and the drive to Rome.

Your description of process/analysis is worth the price of admission

Great job Tik keep up the great work

Lukas and Clark had the battlefield condition which in the American Civil War was referred to as  "the slows".

1:00 "everyone made mustakes" was a great quote.