Brigadier Surinder Singh (retd.), SM, VSM, commanded the 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade—better known as the Kargil Brigade—during the 1999 Kargil War. He has long argued that he repeatedly warned higher headquarters about Pakistani intrusions and intelligence lapses, claims he says were later suppressed or ignored.
During the conflict he was removed from command, and in the war’s aftermath he was dismissed from service—becoming the only Indian Army officer sacked without a general court-martial—over allegations related to handling classified documents, a decision he has contested for years.
A decorated officer (Sena Medal and Vishisht Seva Medal), Singh has continued to seek an official reappraisal of the Kargil record; in 2025 he petitioned India’s Supreme Court for a fresh probe and corrections to the war history.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
This podcast is produced for informational and educational purposes only. The views expressed by the guests are their own opinions and do not reflect the official stance of Podcast Name or its affiliates.
Key Disclaimers:
1. No Professional Advice
• Content shared here does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice. Listeners should consult qualified experts for guidance specific to their circumstances.
2. Accuracy and Corrections
• While we strive to share factual information, we do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of statements made by guests or hosts. Listeners are encouraged to independently verify claims.
• If you believe any content is inaccurate or defamatory, contact us promptly at email for corrections. In appropriate cases, the podcast would be willing to provide its platform for rebuttal if the objection is found suitable for such a purpose.
3. Public Interest Intent
• Discussions focus on matters of public concern and aim to foster informed dialogue. Statements are made in good faith and reflect opinions, not assertions of fact.
4. Third-Party Liability
• Opinions expressed by guests or external contributors belong solely to them. Podcast Name assumes no liability for third-party statements.
5. Legal Boundaries
• This podcast does not intend to harm the reputation of any individual or entity. Content is shared under India’s protections for free speech and public interest discourse.
6. Listener Responsibility
• Use of this podcast’s content is at your own risk. Podcast Name disclaims liability for actions taken based on episode content.
0:00 Trailer
1:41 Brig Surinder’s service - 1971 to Kargil
6:45 Brig Surinder in charge of Kargil brigade
7:59 How Pakis exploited gaps in Kargil
15:47 There was no intelligence failure
17:56 Briefing GoC Budhwar & General Malik
23:03 Intelligence about Pak infiltration
25:40 How Brig Surinder knew about Pak’s plans
30:04 How Kargil generals vacated key areas
33:33 Brig Surinder not told about Pt 5770 infiltration
36:13 Pak destroyed India’s comms before War
37:20 No one knows how Pak captured Pt 5108
38:32 One mistake that killed 527 Indian soldiers
45:30 Why Brig Surinder has filed writ in Supreme Court
47:21 How Brig Surinder’s actions were overturned
52:09 How Kargil generals mismanaged the war
58:24 They lied about Captain Saurabh Kalia
1:02:55 Brig Surinder used Rommel’s strategy
1:04:33 Kargil heroes you have never heard of
1:10:45 Role of General VP Malik
1:15:18 Problem with General Malik’s book
1:18:56 Budhwar’s mistake burnt hundred crores worth of India’s ammunition
1:21:56 Vajpayee had no choice to cross LoC
1:25:38 Why Brig Surinder supports Vajpayee
1:31:30 Assassination attempts on Brig Surinder?
1:35:40 How Brig faced years of investigations
1:40:47 Could Brig Surinder have become Army chief?
1:44:02 Will Supreme Court give justice?
1:50:03 Can Indian army take back PoK?
Brigadier Surinder Singh (retd.), SM, VSM, commanded the 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade—better known as the Kargil Brigade—during the 1999 Kargil War. He has long argued that he repeatedly warned higher headquarters about Pakistani intrusions and intelligence lapses, claims he says were later suppressed or ignored.
During the conflict he was removed from command, and in the war’s aftermath he was dismissed from service—becoming the only Indian Army officer sacked without a general court-martial—over allegations related to handling classified documents, a decision he has contested for years.
A decorated officer (Sena Medal and Vishisht Seva Medal), Singh has continued to seek an official reappraisal of the Kargil record; in 2025 he petitioned India’s Supreme Court for a fresh probe and corrections to the war history.
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER
This podcast is produced for informational and educational purposes only. The views expressed by the guests are their own opinions and do not reflect the official stance of Podcast Name or its affiliates.
Key Disclaimers:
1. No Professional Advice
• Content shared here does not constitute legal, financial, medical, or professional advice. Listeners should consult qualified experts for guidance specific to their circumstances.
2. Accuracy and Corrections
• While we strive to share factual information, we do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of statements made by guests or hosts. Listeners are encouraged to independently verify claims.
• If you believe any content is inaccurate or defamatory, contact us promptly at email for corrections. In appropriate cases, the podcast would be willing to provide its platform for rebuttal if the objection is found suitable for such a purpose.
3. Public Interest Intent
• Discussions focus on matters of public concern and aim to foster informed dialogue. Statements are made in good faith and reflect opinions, not assertions of fact.
4. Third-Party Liability
• Opinions expressed by guests or external contributors belong solely to them. Podcast Name assumes no liability for third-party statements.
5. Legal Boundaries
• This podcast does not intend to harm the reputation of any individual or entity. Content is shared under India’s protections for free speech and public interest discourse.
6. Listener Responsibility
• Use of this podcast’s content is at your own risk. Podcast Name disclaims liability for actions taken based on episode content.
0:00 Trailer
1:41 Brig Surinder’s service - 1971 to Kargil
6:45 Brig Surinder in charge of Kargil brigade
7:59 How Pakis exploited gaps in Kargil
15:47 There was no intelligence failure
17:56 Briefing GoC Budhwar & General Malik
23:03 Intelligence about Pak infiltration
25:40 How Brig Surinder knew about Pak’s plans
30:04 How Kargil generals vacated key areas
33:33 Brig Surinder not told about Pt 5770 infiltration
36:13 Pak destroyed India’s comms before War
37:20 No one knows how Pak captured Pt 5108
38:32 One mistake that killed 527 Indian soldiers
45:30 Why Brig Surinder has filed writ in Supreme Court
47:21 How Brig Surinder’s actions were overturned
52:09 How Kargil generals mismanaged the war
58:24 They lied about Captain Saurabh Kalia
1:02:55 Brig Surinder used Rommel’s strategy
1:04:33 Kargil heroes you have never heard of
1:10:45 Role of General VP Malik
1:15:18 Problem with General Malik’s book
1:18:56 Budhwar’s mistake burnt hundred crores worth of India’s ammunition
1:21:56 Vajpayee had no choice to cross LoC
1:25:38 Why Brig Surinder supports Vajpayee
1:31:30 Assassination attempts on Brig Surinder?
1:35:40 How Brig faced years of investigations
1:40:47 Could Brig Surinder have become Army chief?
1:44:02 Will Supreme Court give justice?
1:50:03 Can Indian army take back PoK?
1. Maj Gen Indrabalan (R) - former BM 70 Infantry Brigade during Kargil War
I have the highest regards for Brig Surender Singh, the then Cdr 121(1) Inf Bde. But his entire interpretation and comments in this podcast in stating that 70 Inf Bde had ever assumed responsibility for the defence/LOC in Drass - Mushkoh Sectors are both factually incorrect and misleading. 121 Inf Bde operational role was to defend the Line of Contol (LoC) across the Kargil Sector. Whereas 70 Inf Bde was located Khaltse clearly tasked to secure the Sonamarg- Kargil NH 1 A for movement of logistics convoy. We had no responsibility to defend the Line of Control.
I was privileged to be the General Staff Officer Grade I (BM) of 70 Inf Bde during Op Vijay from May to Jul 1999 which successfully evicted the enemy from Batalik Sub Sector of Kargil known to be far more treacherous than the Dras Sub Sector. Having assumed my assignment as BM in Jun 1997, when it was in the Kashmir valley for Cl Ops, I was fully aware of the Operational Command and Control of 70 Inf Bde at that time commanded by Brig Devinder Singh, VSM
The LoC Bn in Drass - Mushkoh Sub Sector was 16 Grenadiers, which throughout its tenure remained under 121(I) Inf Bde before de-induction in the last week of May 1999, except for the last ten days in May 1999, when it was placed under 56 Mtn Be (part of 8 Mtn Divil/for the Dras Enemy Eviction Ops in the Sector). 16 Grenadiers the LOC Bn of Drass sector was never placed under comd 70 Inf Bde.
Since the NH 1A passing through Drass was often under fire and needed better management, Dy Cdr 70 Inf Bde in early May 1999 participate in its management with an Arty Bty without guns and some adhoc elements. There were discussions/planning/ ear marking of 70 Inf Bde to take over Drass Mushkoh Sectors, but was subject to awaiting return of its two inf bns from Kashmir valley after Zojila Pass opens or alternate availability from within Ladhakh Sector, which never materialised.
By 08 May 1999, 70 Inf Bde had moved to assume command of Batalik sector for evicting the intrusion there. Rest is History. This is well borne out by records, reporting channel for Reporting Channels for Battle Reports etc including the all encompassing Command & Control Appendix issued by HQ, NC in Dec 1999.
2. Brig Amul Asthana (Retd)
The contention in the podcast that the 3 patrols of 121 (I) Inf Bde which were sent to check the reported presence of intruders in early May 1999, had ‘restored’ or blocked or ‘taken care’ of the Batalik intrusion well before 9-10 May 1999. With due respect to Brigadier Surinder, and with all humility I would like to clarify that this statement is giving a different impression.
Even 10 Para (SF) with Coy 5 Para, was launched directly under HQ 15 Corps, into the Batalik Sector along China Nala to Bump 1 and Bump 2 from 10 to 15 May. Even this effort of the elite forces remained without results, due to heavy enemy presence.
Besides arresting enemy ingress and ascertaining enemy deployments, the first task of 1/11 GR was to locate and extricate these very mentioned patrols of 121(I) Inf Bde. As per the very sketchy information available, both patrols had been ambushed, had suffered casualties and were still pinned down under enemy fire. In the vast area of 15 km from Dah to the Line of Control, and from Khalubar Ridge to Kukarthang ridge, their location was not known. It was with great difficulty, numerous patrols, innovative tactics and at the cost of our own casualties that we accomplished this task. The 16 Grenadiers patrol alone had 04 dead and more wounded and we extricated this patrol and recovered their dead under enemy fire. The 3 Punjab Patrol was extricated from the area of Kukarthang.
In 1999 I was a Lt Col and was the officiating Co of 1/11 GR. The Unit was de-inducted after the Glacier tenure and was on its way to the next location, which was Pune. Bulk of the Unit had already built up at Pune, and the residual strength was approximately 200 only. At this juncture, on 09 May 1999, 1/11 GR was the first bn to be inducted into Batalik Sector and was placed under HQ 70 Inf Bde. We were also the very first infantry battalion placed under 70 Infantry Brigade, which till then had zero infantry battalions.
3. Manish Bhatnagar, ex Major
With due respects to Brig Surinder Singh, who is a highly respected ground commander, I wish to clarify that Brigadier Devinder Singh did not initiate or complaint against me at any stage. Instead he testified supporting my Kargil War performance. मैं यहां पर एक बात स्पष्ट करना चाहता हूँ, कि ब्रिगेडियर देविंदर सिंह सर ने मेरे विरुद्ध किसी भी स्टेज पर कोई चार्ज या आरोप नहीं लगाया। उन्होंने तो स्वयं ये बात On Oath गवाही दी है, कि उन्होंने मुझे हमले का आदेश दिया ही नहीं था, और यह भी कि मेरे साथ भेजे गए जवानो की Physical Condition Critical थी, दरअसल उनकी गवाही के अनुसार उन्होंने चीफ मालिक साहेब से acclamatized, फ्रेश, फिट और मोटिवेटेड ट्रुप्स मांगे थे, लेकिन इसके ठीक विपरीत, मेजर जनरल बधवार, ब्रिगेडियर PC Katoch ने सियाचिन की दूर सुदूर 30 से 50 किलोमीटर और 20000 फुट तक की ऊंचाइयों से जवानो को एक दिन में उतरने का आदेश देकर नीचे बुलाया, उन्हें यह बताया गया कि वे रियर एरिया लेह भेजे जा रहे हैं, और यही ट्रुप्स acclamatised, फ्रेश, फिट और मोटिवेटेड बता कर ब्रिगेडियर देविंदर सिंह के पास बटालिक के दुर्गम और मुश्किल फ्रंट पर भेज दिए, यहां तक कि इन ट्रुप्स को पुराने, नॉन आटोमेटिक और भारी SLR इशू किये और हलके और आटोमेटिक INSAS असाल्ट राइफल मांगे जाने पर भी नहीं दिए, जबकि यूनिट में ब्रांड new इंसास राइफल 800 के करीब अवेलेबल थे, मेजर जनरल बधवार और Lt Gen किशन पाल ने तो ब्रिगेडियर देविंदर सिंह साहेब के कमांड और कण्ट्रोल रिपोर्ट में भरी गड़बड़ियां और फोर्जरी करी, जिसके लिए इनके जैसे काबिल कमांडर ने कई साल कोर्ट के चक्कर काटे और अंततः आर्मी ब्रास ने सुप्रीम कोर्ट में ऑपरेशनल matter होने का हवाला देकर केस रफा दफा करवा दिया.