Why One British Submarine Kept Argentina's Entire Navy In Port For The Whole War
British Bastion
52,407 views
How one British nuclear submarine, HMS Conqueror, forced the entire Argentine Navy back into port for the rest of the 1982 Falklands War.
In April 1982 Argentina put to sea with a real fleet, built around the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, a heavy cruiser, missile-armed destroyers and corvettes. On paper it was the strongest navy in South America and it had a workable plan to strike the British task force from two directions at once.
Britain's answer was a single Churchill-class nuclear submarine that could cross eight thousand miles submerged, stay under for as long as her food lasted, and appear anywhere without warning. This is the story of how that one capability changed the entire naval campaign, and why an unseen threat somewhere out in the dark proved more powerful than anything it actually did.
WHAT THIS VIDEO COVERS
The Argentine fleet of 1982 and the three-group pincer plan built around the carrier Veinticinco de Mayo
Why the carrier strike of the first of May failed on the wind, before anything else happened
HMS Conqueror herself, the Churchill-class design, and why endurance limited only by food rewrites the geometry of an entire ocean
The engagement of the second of May, the decision chain from Chequers to the Total Exclusion Zone, and why an obsolete 1927-design torpedo was chosen over a modern one
The strategic effect that mattered more than the engagement, an entire navy alongside in harbour for the final six weeks of the war
The Perisher command course, the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and the Rolls-Royce reactor chain that Argentina could never replicate
The tragic story of the submarine ARA San Luis, defeated at sea by two wires connected the wrong way round
The honest counter-arguments, the continuing threat from Argentine land-based air power, and the long-running political controversy in Britain
MAJOR RESEARCH SOURCES
The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, by Sir Lawrence Freedman
One Hundred Days, the memoir of Admiral Sandy Woodward
The Argentine Fight for the Falklands, by Martin Middlebrook
Secrets of the Conqueror, by Stuart Prebble
Imperial War Museum, and the Royal Navy Submarine Museum
Interviews with Vice Admiral Sir Tim McClement and statements by Captain Hector Bonzo
FURTHER READING AND VIEWING
Sink the Belgrano, and the wider Belgrano debate in the House of Commons record
The story of Operation Barmaid and the post-war work of the Conqueror diving team
The wider naval history of the 1982 South Atlantic campaign, and the role of British nuclear submarines
If your father, grandfather or uncle served in the submarine service or in the task force of 1982, we would be honoured to know their name and their ship or boat in the comments. That record is how these stories survive.
Subscribe to British Bastion for more long-form military history, told with the ships, the machines and the men remembered properly.
Historical documentary for educational purposes. Archival material is presented in its historical context.
#Falklands #HMSConqueror #RoyalNavy #MilitaryHistory #ColdWar
20 Comments
What is even more interesting is how the Task Force knew that the Belgrano's Attack Group was only the Southern part of a pincer attack and that the Veinticinco de Mayo was at the Northern end. Sandy Woodward knew about the Southern attack group from Conqueror and surmised that this was part of a pincer attack. Only he needed to confirm this.
Lt Cdr Nigel “Sharkey” Ward, commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Squadron planned a reconnaissance sortie with Lt Steve “Spartan” Thomas. He was flying a low‑level route at 100 feet. This made it impossible for the enemy warships to detect him.
At the point where they thought the Northern Group would be, Steve Thomas popped up into the sky to do a search with his Blue Fox radar to see if he could detect any enemy ships. He was immediately lit up by the radars of two Type 42 destroyers and the carrier and they attempted to lock on to him for a Sea Dart missile attack. Thomas not only detected the Argentine warships, but he was right next to them! Thomas quickly ducked down below 100 feet for the return trip to Invincible with the knowledge that the Type 42 were accompanying the Veinticinco de Mayo.
It was this information, combined with Conqueror's observations which were passed to Northwood and then on to the Prime Minister. They soon realised that whilst they were not able to find the Veinticinco de Mayo, they did know where the Belgrano was and considered it a greater threat. That's why they decided to sink the Belgrano, rather than attack the carrier group.
There was also the diesel electric HMS Onyx which was tasked with landing special forces etc.
The current state of the RN Submarine force is a travesty, fortunately it seems to be the one part of the navy that the SDR and DIP are actaully going to do something about.
Why One British Submarine Kept Argentina's Entire Navy In Port For The Whole War
British Bastion
52,407 views
How one British nuclear submarine, HMS Conqueror, forced the entire Argentine Navy back into port for the rest of the 1982 Falklands War.
In April 1982 Argentina put to sea with a real fleet, built around the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, a heavy cruiser, missile-armed destroyers and corvettes. On paper it was the strongest navy in South America and it had a workable plan to strike the British task force from two directions at once.
Britain's answer was a single Churchill-class nuclear submarine that could cross eight thousand miles submerged, stay under for as long as her food lasted, and appear anywhere without warning. This is the story of how that one capability changed the entire naval campaign, and why an unseen threat somewhere out in the dark proved more powerful than anything it actually did.
WHAT THIS VIDEO COVERS
The Argentine fleet of 1982 and the three-group pincer plan built around the carrier Veinticinco de Mayo
Why the carrier strike of the first of May failed on the wind, before anything else happened
HMS Conqueror herself, the Churchill-class design, and why endurance limited only by food rewrites the geometry of an entire ocean
The engagement of the second of May, the decision chain from Chequers to the Total Exclusion Zone, and why an obsolete 1927-design torpedo was chosen over a modern one
The strategic effect that mattered more than the engagement, an entire navy alongside in harbour for the final six weeks of the war
The Perisher command course, the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and the Rolls-Royce reactor chain that Argentina could never replicate
The tragic story of the submarine ARA San Luis, defeated at sea by two wires connected the wrong way round
The honest counter-arguments, the continuing threat from Argentine land-based air power, and the long-running political controversy in Britain
MAJOR RESEARCH SOURCES
The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, by Sir Lawrence Freedman
One Hundred Days, the memoir of Admiral Sandy Woodward
The Argentine Fight for the Falklands, by Martin Middlebrook
Secrets of the Conqueror, by Stuart Prebble
Imperial War Museum, and the Royal Navy Submarine Museum
Interviews with Vice Admiral Sir Tim McClement and statements by Captain Hector Bonzo
FURTHER READING AND VIEWING
Sink the Belgrano, and the wider Belgrano debate in the House of Commons record
The story of Operation Barmaid and the post-war work of the Conqueror diving team
The wider naval history of the 1982 South Atlantic campaign, and the role of British nuclear submarines
If your father, grandfather or uncle served in the submarine service or in the task force of 1982, we would be honoured to know their name and their ship or boat in the comments. That record is how these stories survive.
Subscribe to British Bastion for more long-form military history, told with the ships, the machines and the men remembered properly.
Historical documentary for educational purposes. Archival material is presented in its historical context.
#Falklands #HMSConqueror #RoyalNavy #MilitaryHistory #ColdWar