Pinned post for Q&A :)

EDIT: With regards to the '7 out of 8 battleships' line,  I meant to say "had built and available" as Missouri and Wisconsin were still on shake-down at the time, but I screwed up actually saying the line, apologies!

Lee made the right call. He had little to gain by trying to go toe-to-toe with the Japanese in a night fight, and a lot to lose. At that point in the war, American air power was so dominant that it may well have seemed the Navy wasn't going to take meaningful casualties for the rest of the war, with the exception of the occasional sub attack. Why gamble away a winning advantage by playing into your enemy's few remaining strengths? The only thing that made the IJN relevant again was the kamikaze, and they didn't adopt that until the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

My Grandfather fought and lost his leg during the massive Banzai Charge while operating a M1917 Machine Gun. He was eternally grateful to Admiral Spruance/Lee for protecting their backsides instead of sending the battleships off into an Egotistical machoism contest. It meant the world to the men fighting and dying on the Island that the Fleet didn't leave them.

To Lee's credit, it was very telling that he didn't take up the engagement.  A LOT of commanders would have taken up the challenge for their own self-aggrandizement. He did the right thing.

I find it it amusing, I got into these videos (in part) because I need something interesting to listen to during my commutes, and Drach you apparently started the channel because, of all things, an interest in having something interesting to listen to on your commutes!  Thanks for another quality video.

Lee did the right thing.  Risking his ships in a night engagement just because you wanted a glorious big gun duel would be like foregoing dropping the atomic bombs in favor of proceeding with Operation Olympic just to prove the superiority of American infantry and artillery.

3:05 "Did you correct for the relative speed of the island?"
"What's the relative speed of the island?"
"Nothing, its an island"

Anything could have happened, but even the best case outcome of a crushing US victory seems less good than the historic outcome, so I'd rate Lee's decision pretty highly. Lee seemed to understand the US strengths and felt obliged to play to them even though it meant he'd be playing 2nd fiddle - good man.

You have to respect Lee for declining the engagement. He loved commanding battleships and this was his dream engagement, like the line battles of old. But he gave up the opportunity to protect his men.

Fight to your strengths, not your opponents. If you can take out a Yamato battleship at the cost of 50 aircraft or 1-2 battleships, take the loss in aircraft. As interesting as this engagement would be for us to talk about 80 years later, for the men lost unnecessarily, it would have sucked.

The Pacific theater strategy of island hopping was to avoid fighting unnecessary battles, and this surface engagement was an unnecessary battle against ships that would have minimal effect on the war. Outside of Samar, what damage did they cause because they weren't sunk in the Phillipine sea?

I get the impression that US Naval officers from gunnery up to Nimitz himself still didn't fully understand radar. They seemed to think that radar was the great equalizer to counter Japanese night fighting skill. As seen in the various night battles in the Solomons radar just shows a blip on the screen. It did not show if the blip was a friendly or hostile. US warships with a radar contact still held their fire because they were concerned that the contact may be a friendly. Lee understood that even with radar in a night action would still be chaotic. Ships taking damage and/or sinking would disrupt the formation. Lee's concern about communication breakdowns would cause more chaos. The US Navy's advantage in numbers and quality of ships would have been negated. Lee made the right call.

Think back to the words of Adm Jellico at Jutland, "When you are winning, risk nothing."  While Lee's battle line was not winning itself, the overall battlegroup was winning.  Why risk surface units in a risky and unnecessary night engagement.

7:22 Admiral Lee? Cold feet? Sounds like classic Monday morning quarterbacking, Professor Millett. Lee took a logical and dispassionate assessment of the situation.

Lee was smart. He did not look at a problem from one angle. He was capable of three dimensional thinking. Anyone who could do calculus in his head was capable of seeing multiple outcomes and see which one was most beneficial!

I think Lee knew it was better to let Japanese BBs get attrited by aircraft and submarines rather than slug it out in gun duels - he would not run away if he stumbled into a BB fight but knew there was more to lose than gain in fighting Japanese battleships directly

Wear the "Don't you mean 7 of 10" comments  as a badge of honor Drach.  It is because of you and your videos that so many know that.

Lee had fresh memories of taking an ad-hoc group into action against a well trained enemy. The Battle of Guadalcanal had also demonstrated the damage he could expect if he got into a night knife fight against the IJN. Remember his statement about our ships not being built for the a close in fight. The there is his primary mission, protect the main striking force of the USN, the carriers. If we assume he has at least taken damage he could be out of position to not be able to carry out his primary mission. It is a conservative decision, weighted to protect the carriers. His potential fleet would not have sailed and trained as a unit.They would have to be extracted from present assignments, Assembled along with their escorts, Again a group that would not have at least exercised together. As for the officer the made the comment that radar controlled gunnery doesn't care if it is night or day, this is true, but it also doesn't care if it is friend or foe.

Lee provided his best military advice for winning the war.  Not only was he correct (IMO) to decline a night surface action, but he was correct for operational and strategic reasons.  By the time of Philippine Sea, the IJN could no longer win the war and that was primarily due to unrestricted submarine warfare on the merchant fleet and constant hammering from aircraft.  Why change the calculation by risking assets that take years to build?

I just heard “100 long lances” being in the water and I shuddered. That is a frightening amount of roulette death headed your way.

A what if scenario where Admiral Lee had a Battleship fight? This is where the fun begins (But not fun for the IJN)