🔘 Has the Supreme Court become a negotiating table?
From Mariana to SUS (Brazilian public healthcare system) medications, from Fernando de Noronha to economic plans, the Supreme Federal Court has been resolving some of the country's biggest conflicts not through decisions, but through the ratification of agreements negotiated between the parties. Based on the recent essay by Fredie Didier Jr. and Leandro Fernandez on consensus in constitutional jurisdiction, this episode investigates the silent rise of the so-called "multi-door justice" at the heart of the Brazilian Constitutional Court. We discuss the theory of the Judiciary's ratification function, the limits of control over collective agreements, the prohibition of partial ratification, and the delicate relationship between consensus and precedent. But we also confront uncomfortable questions: what happens to the counter-majoritarian character and publicity of constitutional jurisdiction when it takes place in negotiation environments—sometimes confidential? Does consensus horizontalize power or deepen the protagonism of the rapporteur and the Presidency? And above all: when major economic players sit at the table with the Court, are we facing efficiency or a new and sophisticated way of capturing the courts? A conversation about institutional design, judicial behavior, and the direction of the supremacy of the Constitution in Brazil.
🔍 Guest's Lattes CV: http://lattes.cnpq.br/3021268770189132
💰 Discount Coupons
Contracorrente: ONZESUPREMOS25
Ouse Saber: OUSEONZE
🎥 Chapters
00:00 Opening
03:56 Presentation
04:57 The evolution of the STF's competencies
14:42 The beginning of agreements in the Supreme Court
25:39 The reasons for the rise of agreements
31:13 What are the limits to agreements? 36:27 The lack of criteria for agreements
42:06 The absence of parties
49:25 The issue of representation
53:13 Agreements made unilaterally
01:02:46 Potential erosion of precedents?
01:15:57 Final Considerations
01:19:32 References and Recommendations
📚 References and Recommendations:
📕 Georges Abboud, Agreements in the STF - https://amzn.to/4ueAPe8
📕 Georges Abboud & Trícia Navarro, Consensuality in the STF - https://amzn.to/3Q28Q3e
📕 Fredie Didier Jr. & Leandro Fernandez, Introduction to Multi-Door Justice - https://amzn.to/4oc5cRh
Image
Antonio Augusto/STF
❗️ By purchasing using our Amazon affiliate links, you help the channel by generating commissions and do not create any extra costs for your purchases.
📂 My Lattes Curriculum:
http://lattes.cnpq.br/6713649253136013
🟢 To support us:
Pix Key: 61.184.725/0001-71
https://apoia.se/onzesupremos
🔵 Our networks:
Instagram: Instagram: onzesupremos
Instagram: Instagram: ulyssesblog
Twitter: https://x.com/davidsobreirabm
⚫️ Thematic Summary - Onze Supremos Podcast:
https://ulyssesblog.com.br/podcast/
🔘 Has the Supreme Court become a negotiating table?
From Mariana to SUS (Brazilian public healthcare system) medications, from Fernando de Noronha to economic plans, the Supreme Federal Court has been resolving some of the country's biggest conflicts not through decisions, but through the ratification of agreements negotiated between the parties. Based on the recent essay by Fredie Didier Jr. and Leandro Fernandez on consensus in constitutional jurisdiction, this episode investigates the silent rise of the so-called "multi-door justice" at the heart of the Brazilian Constitutional Court. We discuss the theory of the Judiciary's ratification function, the limits of control over collective agreements, the prohibition of partial ratification, and the delicate relationship between consensus and precedent. But we also confront uncomfortable questions: what happens to the counter-majoritarian character and publicity of constitutional jurisdiction when it takes place in negotiation environments—sometimes confidential? Does consensus horizontalize power or deepen the protagonism of the rapporteur and the Presidency? And above all: when major economic players sit at the table with the Court, are we facing efficiency or a new and sophisticated way of capturing the courts? A conversation about institutional design, judicial behavior, and the direction of the supremacy of the Constitution in Brazil.
🔍 Guest's Lattes CV: http://lattes.cnpq.br/3021268770189132
💰 Discount Coupons
Contracorrente: ONZESUPREMOS25
Ouse Saber: OUSEONZE
🎥 Chapters
00:00 Opening
03:56 Presentation
04:57 The evolution of the STF's competencies
14:42 The beginning of agreements in the Supreme Court
25:39 The reasons for the rise of agreements
31:13 What are the limits to agreements? 36:27 The lack of criteria for agreements
42:06 The absence of parties
49:25 The issue of representation
53:13 Agreements made unilaterally
01:02:46 Potential erosion of precedents?
01:15:57 Final Considerations
01:19:32 References and Recommendations
📚 References and Recommendations:
📕 Georges Abboud, Agreements in the STF - https://amzn.to/4ueAPe8
📕 Georges Abboud & Trícia Navarro, Consensuality in the STF - https://amzn.to/3Q28Q3e
📕 Fredie Didier Jr. & Leandro Fernandez, Introduction to Multi-Door Justice - https://amzn.to/4oc5cRh
Image
Antonio Augusto/STF
❗️ By purchasing using our Amazon affiliate links, you help the channel by generating commissions and do not create any extra costs for your purchases.
📂 My Lattes Curriculum:
http://lattes.cnpq.br/6713649253136013
🟢 To support us:
Pix Key: 61.184.725/0001-71
https://apoia.se/onzesupremos
🔵 Our networks:
Instagram: Instagram: onzesupremos
Instagram: Instagram: ulyssesblog
Twitter: https://x.com/davidsobreirabm
⚫️ Thematic Summary - Onze Supremos Podcast:
https://ulyssesblog.com.br/podcast/